

Pioneer Ibbotson Asset Allocation Series

Performance Analysis and Commentary

September 2011

Third Quarter Review

Two major negative developments emerged during the third quarter.

The first was increasing evidence that in advanced economies, the fiscal and monetary stimulus supplied by governments in 2009 and 2010 has failed to turn into a self-sustaining recovery of private demand. The explanations vary by country, but a number of countries have been held back by one or more of the following headwinds: fiscal consolidation; excess inventory of real estate; highly leveraged households; tight supply of credit; lack of confidence in the robustness of the banking sector; and doubts about the long-term solvency of the government(s).

Concerns about looming European sovereign defaults and the solvency of European banks, in turn, triggered the second negative development of the third quarter: a large increase in financial volatility.

Volatility rose initially after the downgrade of the United States' credit rating by Standard & Poor's back in August. Then bad news from the euro-zone, and weaker-than-expected macroeconomic data took turns at stoking continued uncertainty. The markets fear that European leaders will not be able to handle a financial crisis. The situation is not as dire in the United States, but there, as well, the country suffers from low employment and an uncertain fiscal outlook.

The economies of emerging markets have coped better with the volatility and slowing global growth than have advanced economies. Bank credit is growing strongly and governments have implemented fiscal restraint in an attempt to control over-heating, rather than runaway public debt. If advanced economies tumble, however, commodity prices will crash, world trade will decline, and global demand will contract, and so net exports of emerging countries will suffer. Capital flows will also become even more volatile than they became during the third quarter.

United States

Over the summer, household and business confidence deteriorated markedly on concerns about two threats: the downgrade of the U.S. sovereign-credit rating by Standard & Poor's, and rising tensions in Europe. The lack of confidence has fed back into weaker economic activity. In the three months leading up to September, the average monthly payroll change was just 95,000, down from 131,000 in the first half of 2011. Personal consumption expenditures, which amount to 70% of U.S. gross domestic product (GDP), grew by just 0.4% at an annualized rate in the second quarter, and are on track to increase by just 0.4% to 0.6% in the third quarter, down from 2.1% in the first quarter.

The dynamics that we've observed are reminiscent of the self-reinforcing cycle of depressed sentiment, negative economic data, and further pessimism that characterizes recessions. Indeed, based on statistical models dating back to the 1960s, current economic and financial conditions indicate that it is very likely that a recession could start in the fourth quarter of 2011, or the first quarter of 2012.

A new recession, to be sure, had not started by the end of the third quarter. The job market showed signs of life; industrial production was not shrinking as of August 2011; and domestic demand, albeit weak, had grown at positive rates. But in such a feeble state, we believe the U.S. economy is only one or two shocks away from a contraction. A number of possible shocks in the short term come to mind: a threat of default by a European bank; the need to bail out a euro-zone sovereign nation; a disruption in the supply of oil at any major producing country; and a U.S. government shutdown triggered by partisan wrangling over budget and fiscal policy.

Monetary policy is unlikely to have a large effect, in our opinion, since interest rates are already rock-bottom low. Fiscal policy has a fighting chance, but the proximity of the 2012 presidential election has polarized the positions of Republicans and Democrats over fiscal matters. In particular, we think an undue emphasis on reducing government expenditures jeopardizes the extension of the temporary Social Security tax cuts and prolonged unemployment insurance through 2012. Regardless of whether or not those policies induce employment growth, their cancellation would amount to fiscal tightening, which in the short term would be contractionary.

Euro-Zone

The economy of the euro-zone has begun to falter, even more so than that of the U.S. The uncertainty of the slow-motion debt crisis is like a wet blanket stifling growth. Quarter-to-quarter GDP growth had already slowed down from 3.1% in the first quarter to 0.7% in the second quarter (in annualized terms). The numbers we have for the third quarter seem to point to near-recessionary conditions. The purchasing manager surveys, now available through September 2011, suggest that economic activity started contracting in August, in both the manufacturing and the services industries. Retail sales (ex-vehicles) fell in August. The consumer sentiment numbers through September are consistent with further declines in household expenditures.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) puts the growth forecast for the area at 1.6% this year, and 1.1% in 2012. The European Commission itself envisions growth of just 0.8% (annualized) in the third quarter and 0.4% in the fourth quarter. Activity has deteriorated in the “healthy” as well as the “unhealthy” parts of the currency area. Growth in the Netherlands slowed from 3.4% to 1% between the first and second quarters; in Germany, from 5.5% to 0.5%; and in Austria, from 3.2% to 2.7%. (In Finland, the other member of the prosperous FiNGA club, growth actually increased from 1.1% to 2.5% from the first to second quarter.) Further slowdowns are expected in 2012, relative to 2011.

If the prospects seem upsetting for those four nations, they get utterly depressing for southern Europe. The Greek economy, after shrinking by 2% in 2009 and 4.4% in 2010, could get 5% smaller in 2011 and a further 2% smaller in 2012, according to the IMF. Portugal faces a 2.2% drop in 2011, and a 1.8% drop in 2012. Italy is projected to grow by just 0.6% in 2011, and 0.3% in 2012.

The declining growth prospects fuel the vicious loop between economic growth and sovereign solvency, as less growth makes it harder to bring down the debt-to-GDP ratios. Rising unemployment and stagnant salaries will also make it trickier for politicians to convince German taxpayers to bail out their southern neighbors and avoid a default.

During the third quarter, markets added another link to the economic-fiscal loop: the banking sector.

The increasing probability of a sovereign default undermines the perceived soundness of the European banks in two ways: directly, because domestic banks hold a large share of sovereign debt; and indirectly, because weakness of the sovereigns can make it impossible to rescue the banking sector. Spanish banks are also particularly exposed to real estate prices, which are now in a free fall. Finally, and closing the circle, the banking sector’s problems undermine the overall economy. If the banking sector is thought to be fragile, funding comes under pressure, loans dry up, and the private sector is starved of credit, thus weakening the economy further and deepening the fiscal woes.

We believe there exist four solutions to the sovereign crisis: growth, austerity, default, and devaluation. European leaders will hear of neither default (at least for anybody but Greece) nor devaluation (at least not the nominal kind, which would require a dismemberment of the currency area). The illness, they think, is too much debt. The cure, therefore, will be fiscal austerity.

Other Advanced Economies

After growing briskly in the fourth quarter of 2010 and the first quarter of 2011, Canada’s economy shrank at an annualized rate of 0.4% in the second quarter, partly as a result of disruptions to auto production stemming from the Japanese natural disasters last March, and partly because exports to the U.S. plunged in response to soft demand. The country’s current account deficit swelled to 14.6% of GDP, up from less than 10% in both the fourth quarter of 2010 and the first quarter of 2011. Corporate profits after taxes declined in the second quarter relative to the first quarter—Canada had not seen a quarter-to-quarter decline in aggregate profits since mid-2009.

In the near term, holding back Canada’s economy could be the drop of commodity prices and fiscal austerity, as the federal government is firmly committed to balancing the budget in four years. Monetary policy, at least, is not contractionary. Moderate inflation, the slowing economy, and an unusually dangerous global outlook have convinced the country’s central bank to adopt a neutral stance, claiming that “the need to withdraw monetary policy stimulus has diminished.”

The Canadian dollar depreciated sharply versus the U.S. dollar during the third quarter, following the pullback of commodity prices and the safe-haven demand for the American currency amid market volatility. As of the end of the quarter, the Canadian loonie traded at \$0.95, which is cheap but still significantly above the \$0.77 that we saw during the depths of the 2008 financial crisis. Continuing angst over the euro-zone crisis should put downward pressure on the Canadian dollar compared with the U.S. dollar, thus helping exporters in the medium term.

In the United Kingdom, the recovery is at risk of derailing. Output growth slowed to 0.4% in the second quarter (from 1.6%), at an annual rate. Although the path of output has been affected by temporary factors, the underlying rate of growth has also moderated. For example, the trend of manufacturing output and new orders over the third quarter as a whole were markedly weaker than in both the first and second quarters. Business slowed down in the services industries as well, although to a lesser extent than in manufacturing. Two-thirds of economic activity in the U.K. is accounted for by consumer spending, and the squeeze on households’ real incomes, plus the fiscal consolidation, are likely to continue to weigh on domestic spending.

As for Japan, it might well be the only large advanced economy where the pace of growth has been accelerating. Japan’s economic activity has been picking up as the supply-side obstacles caused by the March earthquake and tsunami have been almost completely ironed out. The disasters were the main factor behind the 3.7% drop in output during the first quarter and the 2.1% drop in the second quarter (quarter-to-quarter, annualized). GDP growth received a big boost from government consumption and investment, with a contribution of 1.1% to quarter-to-quarter

growth in the second quarter. The replenishment of inventories provided another 0.4% boost. Consumer expenditures and private investment did not add to total demand, but at least they recovered from the negative rates of growth seen in the first quarter. Exports plummeted, however, as manufacturers faced logistical restrictions to producing and delivering goods.

The data available for the third quarter shows that exports had almost recovered to pre-earthquake levels by July. Industrial production has been reaching the levels seen one year ago and housing starts grew briskly in July and August. The unemployment rate fell to 4.3% in August, from a high of 4.7% in April.

We expect higher growth in the third quarter than in the second. Replenishment of inventories and public spending on the reconstruction of infrastructure should continue powering growth for a few more months. Private demand probably will gain some momentum as suppliers return to more normal production levels, employment recovers, incomes rise, and corporate sales and profits return.

Emerging Markets

In local currency, emerging market equities lost about the same as U.S. equities. In dollar terms, however, they lost a lot more, as overall investment flows favored the “safety” of the U.S. dollar. Asia lost the least in dollar terms, whereas Eastern Europe experienced the steepest losses and Latin America’s decline fell in the middle.

Emerging market bonds showed a negative return during the third quarter. Global volatility, however, did not wreak havoc in the emerging sovereign markets until September, when they declined by 4.2%. The yield-to-maturity ended the quarter at 6.5%, up from 6% on June 30, 2011. Spreads rose to 450 basis points (bps) from 288 bps at the beginning of the quarter. Most of the spread widening happened in September. Yield spreads rose sharply in Eastern Europe, which is the region that would be most affected by a recession or financial crisis in the euro-zone. It also reflects the sensitivity of economies like Belarus, Ukraine, and Russia to expected declines in commodity prices.

In theory, emerging market assets provide valuable diversification opportunities. However, the world is still a long ways from the decoupling between advanced and emerging markets. The reason stems from both economics and finance. First, emerging economies are still largely dependent on spending in advanced countries, as reflected by their large current account surpluses (as a whole). Second, on a historical basis, periods of heightened volatility usually have been accompanied by higher correlation across stock markets. And third, there has also been a long-term increase in the correlation across domestic equity markets, as more and more emerging economies become integrated with the world economy, and more money managers add emerging market assets to their portfolios. Diversification, at least for now, has only become harder.

For that reason, we think the risk-premium argument is likely to trump the fundamentals argument for emerging market assets as well. We think that emerging market assets are a long-term winning bet, but we do not expect them to outperform their counterparts in developed markets if financial turmoil and a global recession occur.

As for China, it remains the largest bright spot in the world economy. Year-on-year growth was 9.5% in the second quarter. In 2012, the country’s output is expected to increase by 9%; that is less than the average increase of 10.5% during the period between 2000 and 2007, but it’s still impressive. In the 12 months ended August 31, 2011, retail sales rose by 17% and have remained roughly unchanged for the last six months. Consumer confidence about the future has only grown stronger. The pace of investment in “urban fixed assets,” where real estate carries a lot of weight, has not eased either, with one-year increases of 25% since February 2011.

The risk for China is that a slowdown in advanced economies might bring investment growth to a halt. Moreover, much of the credit for investment projects is implicitly subsidized, because the government caps the remuneration of savings. Artificially cheap funding, plus government-directed projects, often add up to inefficient allocation of capital and mismanaged banks.

Elsewhere in Asia, activity remained solid in the first half of 2011, moderated only by the disruption of supply chains resulting from the Japanese disasters last spring, and weaker external demand. Some countries have experienced a slowdown in export growth, but their economies remain supported by accommodative fiscal policies, robust growth of credit and asset prices, and strong demand for labor. Domestic demand would dampen the effect of a global slowdown, but not completely, as most countries in the region still rely on net exports and transfers. The IMF projects that most Asian economies will run large current account surpluses over the next five years.

Equities

Equity markets suffered during the third quarter as the growth outlook deteriorated and the euro-zone debt crisis took its toll on bank stocks. As of September 30, 2011, several European banks were trading below their book values.

The pullback in stock prices has left valuations much less stretched, from the point of view of long-term models. Moreover, in an environment of high volatility, fundamentals have seemed to weigh less than risk premiums. Attractive price multiples are no guarantee of positive future returns, however. We expect that equity markets will continue to be dominated by wild swings over the short term as the markets figure out whether the global economy is tilting towards recession, or just slow growth, and European leaders keep working to flesh out a response to the sovereign-debt and banking crisis.

Up to the start of the second quarter of 2011, earnings of Standard & Poor's 500 (S&P 500) companies had been increasing for ten consecutive quarters. Operating margins increased again, to 9.5%, beating another historical maximum. Third quarter earnings will start trickling out in earnest just a couple of weeks from now, but estimates are slightly less optimistic than in previous quarters. The consensus forecast is a one-year 14% increase in earnings, down from 19% in the second quarter. For 2011 as a whole, the consensus estimate implies a 17% increase, and a 14% rise in 2012.

We do not expect big changes in earnings in the third quarter. The relevant question is: What will happen in the fourth quarter? The estimate for fourth quarter earnings has declined by 1.8% over the last three months. The actual figures for the third quarter will offer meaningful guidance as to where earnings will go in the home stretch of 2011 and into 2012. As we have mentioned several times in the past, our concern is that operating margins have been driving the growth of earnings since 2009. Margin growth is achieved through improving efficiency, cutting costs, bringing unused capacity online, and controlling input prices. None of those processes can continue indefinitely, however, and so margin growth is impossible to perpetuate ad infinitum. At some point, sales growth needs to kick in, and over the last two years, top lines have been growing only timidly. In the current business cycle, sales have not caught up with their long-term trends, in spite of the fact that more than 50% of sales for S&P 500 companies come from outside the U.S.

Elsewhere in advanced countries, stocks were hardest hit in Europe, by region, and in financials, among sectors. The UK's FTSE 100 Index declined by 13% and Germany's DAX Index dropped by 25%; but European financials declined by 28%. The hesitation of European leaders to address the debt and banking crises has understandably unnerved investors. In the fourth quarter, we expect more volatility in those markets as well. Japan's Topix Index did not fare too badly, however, shedding only 9% over the quarter.

Fixed Income

In the U.S., the announcement of a swap of long-term debt for short-term debt by the Federal Reserve Board (the Fed), known as "Operation Twist," plus the Fed's stated intention to keep interest rates exceptionally low "at least through mid-2013," supported lower long-term yields, in addition to the aforementioned flight to safety into U.S. Treasuries during the third quarter. If market volatility and macroeconomic weakness continue to reign, as we expect, it is likely that Treasury prices will go higher, with the 10-year Treasury yield hitting 1% to 1.5%, down from the current 2%. In Japan, the 10-year bond decoupled from the U.S. yield in around mid-July.

There have been no signs of investor flight from the sovereign debt of the U.S. and Japan. However, without more ambitious fiscal consolidation, we cannot rule out a rise in government yields over the medium term. The rise in long-term yields could happen in different ways. Investors could shift their portfolios towards corporate or emerging market debt, which would narrow credit spreads and emerging market spreads; investors could start putting more weight on the short end of the curve, increasing the term premium; and finally, investors could shun sovereigns entirely, instead hoarding cash and precious metals.

Long-term corporate bond spreads rose in the U.S. and Europe, although not in Japan. For BBB-rated U.S. corporate borrowers, spreads increased by around 100 bps, to 3.1%, which is well above the 2.1% average since 1997. Below-investment-grade quality spreads rose even more substantially: by 240 bps for BB issues and 290 bps for B issues. If the financial crisis of 2008 serves as any guide, these spreads could go much higher.

Leaving aside the financial sector, large corporations are in a good position to weather a liquidity drought. They have accumulated large amounts of liquid assets, paid off many short-term liabilities, and refinanced their debt at low interest rates. Small businesses would suffer more, however, since they are more dependent on bank loans and sometimes on consumer credit.

Sovereigns rallied in the advanced economies. Out of the 23 advanced countries that we follow, the 10-year yield went down in 20 of them (the exceptions were Italy, Portugal, and Greece). Whether justified or not, the markets have taken refuge in sovereign debt and not corporate debt, equities, or emerging market assets. That's nothing new, but what is perhaps surprising is that the rally has coincided with rising sovereign risk premiums. The price of credit default spreads (CDS) spiked over the quarter. Countries such as Denmark, France, and Japan, whose solvency would have never been questioned, are all being priced with an implied default probability of more than 10%.

Greece is almost unanimously believed to be insolvent. As of September 30, 2011, the probability of default implied by the price of Greek CDS was at 90% to 100%, assuming a recovery rate of 30% to 40%. Portugal was not far behind, with a 61% probability.

The big news last quarter was the entry of Italy onto the list of the world's top-10 riskiest sovereigns. Taking those CDS quotes at face value, Italy's debt is dodgier than Egypt's and Romania's. The markets appeared to react to concerns about Italy's high debt-to-GDP ratio and whether or not the austerity package announced by the Italian government will be enough to reduce debt. A key factor to understanding the CDS numbers is the status of the banking sectors in those countries. As we explained previously, sovereign risk and financial risk feed off each other.

Outlook

In the third quarter of 2011, the world economy took a turn for the worse. A global recession within the next six months is not certain, but we believe the odds are now higher than 50%.

In our last commentary, a series of one-time events (disasters in Japan, disruption of oil supply) had led us to conjecture that the slowdown observed in the second quarter was temporary. As we wrote in the quarterly commentary back then: "...it is likely that the economy will stop decelerating and will regain some strength in the third quarter." Unfortunately, we were wrong.

Now that months have passed and economic activity has grown weaker, not stronger, it is clear to us that more than just a "soft patch" in the economy was taking place. The structural obstacles that hold back economic growth in advanced economies have more than offset cyclical momentum, which normally makes the economy grow faster at the beginning of a new business cycle.

Changes to the Pioneer Portfolios

On September 22, 2011, Ibbotson's tactical asset allocation committee elected to underweight equities across all portfolios. In the event of a recession, a financial crisis, or even in an environment where capital markets perceive that the likelihood of either event is rising, equities are likely to deliver negative returns. Long-term yields are already historically low (the 10-year Treasury yield recently hit a 40-year low), real yields are already well into negative territory, and we think the potential for further price appreciation of Treasuries is very limited.

Our annual long-term asset class models are updated each year at the end of the third quarter. Ibbotson made small shifts among asset classes that included: 1) bumping up the ratio of non-U.S. equities to overall equities in the portfolios; 2) increasing the ratio of emerging market equities to non-U.S. equities in the portfolios; and 3) shifting the portfolios' mix of intermediate-term bonds and short-term bonds to increase the yield in our models. Ibbotson's annual model updates are implemented during October.

Strategy Summary

Our tactical asset allocation program currently includes an underweight to real estate investment trusts and an overweight to large-cap U.S. equities. The recent outperformance of U.S. property stocks has left them with valuation ratios that can be difficult to sustain over the medium term, and that are hard to justify by fundamentals. Large-cap stocks exhibit the cheapest valuations within the U.S. equity space.

Within our asset classes, we currently prefer non-European sovereign bonds over European bonds. The sovereign-bond crisis in the euro-zone is still unfolding. The fiscal position of several countries (Greece, Ireland, Spain, Portugal, and Italy among them) threatens the survival of the currency union as we know it. We believe deep economic and institutional changes are needed to avert disaster. In the meantime, the markets will likely besiege the bond market in Europe, pushing yields up and putting downward pressure on the currency.

The portfolios currently have overweights of U.S. investment-grade corporate bonds and underweights of U.S. high-yield bonds. If a recession (or a debt crisis in the euro-zone) occurs, not only can credit spreads widen, but they can widen more for issuers with less credit quality. Lower-rated issuers have a higher risk of default and a more difficult time finding market financing at all during a credit squeeze.

The portfolios currently have overweights of U.S. large-cap equities and underweights of U.S. small-cap equities. Small-cap stocks appear overvalued relative to large-cap stocks. They also are probably more sensitive to swings in the overall equity markets, and so in the event of a downturn, which we think is more likely than not, small-cap equities are expected to fare worse than large caps.

The portfolios currently have overweights of cash and cash-equivalent assets, and an overall underweight of equities.

Ibbotson Associates Advisors Portfolio Management Value Added

Ibbotson Associates Advisors, LLC, adds value through the following four areas in the portfolio management process over the long run.

- Strategic Asset Allocation: Strategic Asset Allocation seeks to capture diversification benefits among asset classes over the long run.*
- Dynamic Asset Allocation: Dynamic Asset Allocation seeks to enhance portfolio risk-adjusted returns by changing the asset allocation over time to exploit intermediate-term market opportunities.
- Manager/Fund Selection: Manager/Fund Selection seeks to add value through selecting consistent and superior managers and/or funds.
- Risk Management: Risk management seeks to control active risk relative to the long-term Strategic Asset Allocation so that the portfolios maintain the core strategic asset allocation characteristics over time.

*Diversification does not assure a profit or protect against loss in a declining market.

Performance Review

Pioneer Ibbotson Aggressive Allocation Fund

Pioneer Ibbotson Aggressive Allocation Fund Class A shares returned -16.10% at net asset value in the third quarter, while the Standard and Poor's 500 Index (the S&P 500) returned -13.87% and the Barclays Capital Aggregate Bond Index (the Barclays Index) returned 3.82%.

For the quarter ended September 30, 2011, the Pioneer Ibbotson Aggressive Allocation Fund underperformed its basic asset allocation benchmark (comprised of 90% S&P 500 Index and 10% Barclays Capital Aggregate Bond Index). The Fund's long-term asset class model (the Strategic Model) detracted value versus the basic asset allocation benchmark, as non-U.S. equities (developed and emerging) underperformed the S&P 500. Contributing strongly to this was the euro's more than 7% depreciation relative to the U.S. dollar this quarter. The Fund's U.S. growth equity allocation added value relative to the S&P 500. In our tactical program, the Fund's 2% small-cap equity underweight helped performance as small caps underperformed large caps over the quarter. The Fund's 4% real estate investment trust (REIT) underweight had a negligible effect on performance. Overall, the underlying funds slightly underperformed relative to their blended benchmark indices. Pioneer Fundamental Growth Fund, Pioneer Equity Income Fund and Pioneer International Value Fund added the most alpha.** Pioneer Fund and Pioneer Mid Cap Value Fund underperformed their blended indices this quarter.

**Alpha is a measure of performance on a risk-adjusted basis. Alpha takes the volatility (that is, price risk) of a mutual fund and compares its risk-adjusted performance to a benchmark index. The excess return of the mutual fund relative to the benchmark index is known as the mutual fund's alpha.

Average Annual Total Returns (Class A shares)

September 30, 2011	(at NAV)	(at POP)	S&P 500 Index	Barclays Capital Aggregate Bond Index
1 year	-4.81%	-10.22%	1.13%	5.26%
3 years	0.78%	-1.20%	1.23%	7.97%
5 years	-2.06%	-3.21%	-1.18%	6.53%
Life (8/9/2004)	2.87%	2.02%	2.94%	5.62%

Expense Ratio

(As of prospectus dated December 1, 2010)

Gross	1.77%
Net	1.74%

Call 1-800-225-6292 or visit us.pioneerinvestments.com for the most recent month-end performance results. Current performance may be lower or higher than the performance data quoted.

The performance data quoted represents past performance, which is no guarantee of future results. Investment return and principal value will fluctuate, and shares, when redeemed, may be worth more or less than their original cost.

The NAV results represent the percent change in net asset value per share. Returns would have been lower had sales charges been reflected. The POP performance data reflects deduction of the maximum 5.75% sales charge at the beginning of the period. All results are historical and assume the reinvestment of dividends and capital gains. Other share classes are available for which performance and expenses will differ.

Performance results reflect any applicable expense waivers in effect during the periods shown. Without such waivers fund performance would be lower. Waivers may not be in effect for all funds. Certain fee waivers are contractual through a specified period. Otherwise, fee waivers can be rescinded at any time. See the prospectus for more information.

The net expense ratio reflects contractual limitations currently in effect through 12/1/2012 for Class A shares. There can be no assurance that Pioneer will extend the expense limitations beyond such time. Please see the prospectus for more information.

Pioneer Ibbotson Growth Allocation Fund

Pioneer Ibbotson Growth Allocation Fund Class A shares returned -13.80% at net asset value in the third quarter, while the Standard and Poor's 500 Index (the S&P 500) returned -13.87% and the Barclays Capital Aggregate Bond Index (the Barclays Index) returned 3.82%.

For the quarter ended September 30, 2011, the Pioneer Ibbotson Growth Allocation Fund underperformed its basic asset allocation benchmark (comprised of 75% S&P 500 Index and 25% Barclays Capital Aggregate Bond Index) after management fees. The Fund's long-term asset class model (the Strategic Model) detracted value versus the basic asset allocation benchmark, as non-U.S. equities (developed and emerging) underperformed the S&P 500. Contributing strongly to this was the euro's 7% depreciation relative to the dollar this quarter. The Fund's large-cap U.S. growth equity allocation added value relative to the S&P 500. In our tactical program, the Fund's 2% small-cap equity underweight helped performance as small caps underperformed large caps during the quarter. The Fund's 3% REIT underweight had a negligible effect on performance. Overall, the underlying funds underperformed relative to their blended benchmark indices. Pioneer Fundamental Growth Fund, Pioneer Equity Income Fund and Pioneer International Value Fund added the most alpha.** Pioneer Fund and Pioneer Mid Cap Value Fund underperformed their blended indices this quarter.

**Alpha is a measure of performance on a risk-adjusted basis. Alpha takes the volatility (that is, price risk) of a mutual fund and compares its risk-adjusted performance to a benchmark index. The excess return of the mutual fund relative to the benchmark index is known as the mutual fund's alpha.

Average Annual Total Returns (Class A shares)

September 30, 2011	(at NAV)	(at POP)	S&P 500 Index	Barclays Capital Aggregate Bond Index
1 year	-3.51%	-9.06%	1.13%	5.26%
3 years	2.09%	0.08%	1.23%	7.97%
5 years	-0.78%	-1.94%	-1.18%	6.53%
Life (8/9/2004)	3.18%	2.33%	2.94%	5.62%

Expense Ratio

(As of prospectus dated December 1, 2010)

Gross	1.64%
Net	1.63%

Call 1-800-225-6292 or visit us.pioneerinvestments.com for the most recent month-end performance results. Current performance may be lower or higher than the performance data quoted.

The performance data quoted represents past performance, which is no guarantee of future results. Investment return and principal value will fluctuate, and shares, when redeemed, may be worth more or less than their original cost.

The NAV results represent the percent change in net asset value per share. Returns would have been lower had sales charges been reflected. The POP performance data reflects deduction of the maximum 5.75% sales charge at the beginning of the period. All results are historical and assume the reinvestment of dividends and capital gains. Other share classes are available for which performance and expenses will differ.

Performance results reflect any applicable expense waivers in effect during the periods shown. Without such waivers fund performance would be lower. Waivers may not be in effect for all funds. Certain fee waivers are contractual through a specified period. Otherwise, fee waivers can be rescinded at any time. See the prospectus for more information.

The net expense ratio reflects contractual limitations currently in effect through 12/1/2012 for Class A shares. There can be no assurance that Pioneer will extend the expense limitations beyond such time. Please see the prospectus for more information.

Pioneer Ibbotson Moderate Allocation Fund

Pioneer Ibbotson Moderate Allocation Fund Class A shares returned -11.35% at net asset value in the third quarter, while the Standard and Poor's 500 Index (the S&P 500) returned -13.87% and the Barclays Capital Aggregate Bond Index (the Barclays Index) returned 3.82%.

For the quarter ended September 30, 2011, the Pioneer Ibbotson Moderate Allocation Fund underperformed its basic asset allocation benchmark (currently comprised of 60% S&P 500 Index, 37% Barclays Capital Aggregate Bond Index and 3% cash). The Fund's long-term asset class model (the Strategic Model) detracted value versus the basic asset allocation benchmark, as high-yield bonds strongly underperformed the Barclays Index and non-U.S. equities underperformed the S&P 500. The Fund's large-cap U.S. growth equity allocation added value relative to the S&P 500. In our tactical program, the Fund's 1.5% high-yield bond underweight helped relative performance as the high-yield asset class declined by more than 6% over the quarter, and the Barclays Index returned a positive 3.82%. The Fund's 1% small-cap equity underweight helped performance as small caps underperformed large caps this quarter. The Fund's 2% REIT underweight had a negligible effect on performance. Overall, the underlying funds underperformed relative to their blended benchmark indices. Pioneer Fundamental Growth Fund, Pioneer Equity Income Fund and Pioneer Oak Ridge Small Cap Growth Fund added the most alpha.** Pioneer Global High Yield Fund and Pioneer Bond Fund underperformed their blended indices this quarter.

**Alpha is a measure of performance on a risk-adjusted basis. Alpha takes the volatility (that is, price risk) of a mutual fund and compares its risk-adjusted performance to a benchmark index. The excess return of the mutual fund relative to the benchmark index is known as the mutual fund's alpha.

Average Annual Total Returns (Class A shares)

September 30, 2011	(at NAV)	(at POP)	S&P 500 Index	Barclays Capital Aggregate Bond Index
1 year	-2.30%	-7.91%	1.13%	5.26%
3 years	3.26%	1.25%	1.23%	7.97%
5 years	0.47%	-0.72%	-1.18%	6.53%
Life (8/9/2004)	3.41%	2.56%	2.94%	5.62%

Expense Ratio

(As of prospectus dated December 1, 2010)

Gross	1.51%
Net	1.51%

Call 1-800-225-6292 or visit us.pioneerinvestments.com for the most recent month-end performance results. Current performance may be lower or higher than the performance data quoted.

The performance data quoted represents past performance, which is no guarantee of future results. Investment return and principal value will fluctuate, and shares, when redeemed, may be worth more or less than their original cost.

The NAV results represent the percent change in net asset value per share. Returns would have been lower had sales charges been reflected. The POP performance data reflects deduction of the maximum 5.75% sales charge at the beginning of the period. All results are historical and assume the reinvestment of dividends and capital gains. Other share classes are available for which performance and expenses will differ.

Performance results reflect any applicable expense waivers in effect during the periods shown. Without such waivers fund performance would be lower. Waivers may not be in effect for all funds. Certain fee waivers are contractual through a specified period. Otherwise, fee waivers can be rescinded at any time. See the prospectus for more information.

Pioneer Ibbotson Conservative Allocation Fund

Pioneer Ibbotson Conservative Allocation Fund returned -6.34% at net asset value in the third quarter, while the Standard and Poor's 500 Index (the S&P 500) returned -13.87% and the Barclays Capital Aggregate Bond Index (the Barclays Index) returned 3.82%.

For the quarter ended September 30, 2011, the Pioneer Ibbotson Conservative Allocation Fund underperformed its basic asset allocation benchmark (comprised of 30% S&P 500 Index, 63% Barclays Capital Aggregate Bond Index, and 7% cash). The Fund's long-term asset class model (the Strategic Model) detracted value versus the basic asset allocation benchmark, as high-yield bonds and short-term bonds underperformed the Barclays Index. The Fund's large-cap U.S. growth equity allocation added value relative to the S&P 500. Our tactical asset allocation program added value during the third quarter. The Fund's 2.5% high-yield bond underweight helped relative performance as the high-yield asset class declined by more than 6% during the quarter, and the Barclays Index returned a positive 3.82%. The Fund's 1% REIT underweight had a negligible effect on performance. Overall, the underlying funds underperformed relative to their blended benchmark indices. Pioneer Equity Income Fund, Pioneer Fundamental Growth Fund and Pioneer Multi-Asset Floating Rate Fund added the most alpha.** Pioneer Global High Yield Fund and Pioneer Bond Fund underperformed their blended indices this quarter.

**Alpha is a measure of performance on a risk-adjusted basis. Alpha takes the volatility (that is, price risk) of a mutual fund and compares its risk-adjusted performance to a benchmark index. The excess return of the mutual fund relative to the benchmark index is known as the mutual fund's alpha.

Average Annual Total Returns (Class A shares)

September 30, 2011	(at NAV)	(at POP)	S&P 500 Index	Barclays Capital Aggregate Bond Index
1 year	-0.14%	-5.90%	1.13%	5.26%
3 years	4.90%	2.84%	1.23%	7.97%
5 years	2.50%	1.29%	-1.18%	6.53%
Life (5/15/2005)	3.31%	2.36%	1.78%	5.79%

Expense Ratio

(As of prospectus dated December 1, 2010)

Gross	1.51%
Net	1.45%

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The NAV results represent the percent change in net asset value per share. Returns would have been lower had sales charges been reflected. The POP performance data reflects deduction of the maximum 5.75% sales charge at the beginning of the period. All results are historical and assume the reinvestment of dividends and capital gains. Other share classes are available for which performance and expenses will differ.

Performance results reflect any applicable expense waivers in effect during the periods shown. Without such waivers fund performance would be lower. Waivers may not be in effect for all funds. Certain fee waivers are contractual through a specified period. Otherwise, fee waivers can be rescinded at any time. See the prospectus for more information.

The net expense ratio reflects contractual limitations currently in effect through 12/1/2012 for Class A shares. There can be no assurance that Pioneer will extend the expense limitations beyond such time. Please see the prospectus for more information.

A Word about Risk:

Each Fund's performance depends on the advisor's skill in determining the strategic asset class allocations, the mix of underlying Pioneer funds, as well as the performance of those underlying funds. The underlying funds' performance may be lower than the performance of the asset class that they were selected to represent.

Stocks and bonds can decline due to adverse issuer, market, regulatory, or economic developments. International markets may be less liquid and can be more volatile than U.S. markets. These risk factors, including those associated with currency exchange rates also apply to investments in international markets, all of which make international markets more volatile and less liquid than investments in domestic markets. Some of the underlying funds can invest in either high-yield securities or small/emerging growth companies. Investments in these types of securities generally are subject to greater volatility than either higher-grade securities or more established companies, respectively.

These risks may increase share price volatility.

The Standard and Poor's 500 Index (the S&P 500) is a commonly used measure of the broad U.S. stock market. The Barclays Capital Aggregate Bond Index is a market value-weighted measure of Treasury and agency issues, corporate bond issues and mortgage-backed securities. Index returns are calculated monthly, assume reinvestment of dividends and, unlike Fund returns, do not reflect any fees, expenses or sales charges. It is not possible to invest directly in an index.

The views expressed in this commentary are those of the portfolio managers, and are subject to change at any time. These views do not necessarily reflect the views of Pioneer or others in the Pioneer organization, and should not be relied upon as investment advice, as securities recommendations, or as an indication of trading intent on behalf of any Pioneer investment product.

Before investing, consider the Fund's investment objectives, risks, charges and expenses. Contact your advisor or Pioneer Investments for a prospectus (or summary prospectus, if available) containing this information. Read it carefully.

The investments you choose should correspond to your financial needs, goals, and risk tolerance. For assistance in determining your financial situation, please consult an investment professional.

Not FDIC insured • May lose value • No bank guarantee